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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEFFERY J. JERZ, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 890366 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT JEFFERY J. JERZ 
INTRODUCTION 
This Reply brief addresses pointp raised in 
Respondent's brief and seeks to clarify fabts and issues 
presented in this Appeal 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Jeffery J. T^erz, seeks a 
reversal of the Order and Judgment of the District Court 
granting Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A reversal would enable Plaintiff-Appellant to proceed with 
his claim against the Defendant - Respondeat for negligence. 
FACTS 
The facts as previously stated in both Appellant 
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and Respondent's Briefs will not be re-stated herein. 
ARGUMENT 
In every case cited by the Respondent involving a 
"road" the road was actually located on the recreational 
property. In the instant case the Appellant was using the 
Salt Lake County road to get to the Kennecott Lookout. At 
the time Appellant struck the rock in the roadway he was not 
on recreational property nor was he performing a 
recreational activity as defined in the Statute. 
In the Umpleby case, the Recreational Use Statute 
definitional section contained the language "camping and 
pleasure driving". Umpleby was travelling to a reservoir to 
rendezvous with some friends who were camping there. The 
Utah Statute does not contain the language "pleasure 
driving" but does contain this language ("and viewing or 
enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific 
sites. (57-14-2) At the time of Plaintiff's injury he was 
driving up the Butterfield Canyon road to get to private 
property to view the valley from the Kennecott Lookout. 
The significant difference in Umpleby and this case 
is, that the reservoir to which he was travelling and the 
road he was on, were both on federally owned property and 
constituted the "recreational property". 
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Respondent in his brief at page ft.1 refers to 
Butterfield Canyon road as a "remote mountain road" and yet 
it begins in Salt Lake Valley just as Emigration, Millcreek 
and all other canyons situated in the Salt Lake Valley. 
Clearly, this canyon road was not one that should be covered 
by the act. 
Respondent cites the Sega v. State case on page 10 
of his brief for the proposition that government owned roads 
are covered by the limitation of liability statutes. The 
viability of Sega is in doubt after a later decision by the 
same New York Court, Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 68 N.Y. 
2d 446, 502 N.E. 2d 972, 510 N.Y.S. 2d 57 (1986). Sega was 
also rejected by a lower New York Court in 3'keefe v. State, 
104 A.D. 2d 43, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 920 (1984). The Court in 
O'keefe reasoned that the State should be liable for 
negligent acts in developed recreational areas as contrasted 
with the undeveloped lands in Sega. 
The Otteson case is cited by the Ewell Court in 
Ewell v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Utah 1984) 
aff'd, 776 F. 2d 46 (10 Cir. 1985), for th^ proposition that 
since the Federal Land Manager could close nortions of the 
public land to the use of off-road vehicle^, it had no 
obligation to make the land in question available to the 
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public for recreational vehicles. Consequently, the United 
States is entitled to immunity under the act. Salt Lake 
County has no authority to close the road in the instant 
case but could abandon it to the adjacent property owners. 
In Seyler v. United States, 832 F 2d 120 (9th Cir. 
1987) the Court held that the recreational use statute did 
not apply to protect the government from liability for a 
one-vehicle motorcycle accident that occurred on an Indian 
Reservation roadway, although the injured party was going 
for a pleasure ride at the time. The following language in 
the Seyler case at page 122 clearly applies to the facts in 
this case: 
"The government's contention accepted by 
the District Court, is that the recreational 
use statute applies on any road or highway in 
Idaho. Such a result is absurd. The Idaho 
legislature cannot have intended to remove 
tort protection against road defects from 
all persons who drive for other than 
business purposes anywhere in Idaho". 
Finally, the statute in question was enacted to 
encourage the opening of remote and pristine lands to the 
general public. The Butterfield Canyon road although 
primarily used by many hunters, hikers, bikers and other 
recreational users has also been used to traverse the 
Oquirrahs to and from Salt Lake County to Tooele County. 
The act was meant to apply to roads on recreational property 
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that are not regularly maintained. The classification of 
Butterfield Canyon Road as a six on a scal^ of one to six, 
with the larger number representing the less maintained 
road, clearly demonstrates regular maintenance. As such it 
should not be included under the immunity provided by the 
limitation statute. 
If Defendant's rationale were accepted by this 
Court, then Millcreek Canyon, Cottonwood Canyon and all 
other canyons in Salt Lake County would be immunized under 
the statute. This would be an absurd result. 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment granted by the Third District 
Court should be vacated and the Plaintiff allowed to proceed 
with its claim. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
MAW BILJANlC^ / 
Attorney forar P^a in t i f f -ADDel l an t 
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